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∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Campaign finance reform stands as one of the most
important issues in today’s modern elections. From national to
municipal contests, the influx of large donations places wealthy
individuals—and interests—at odds with the average voter.
Over the years, volumes of academic and legislative reforms
have been proposed that encompass a wide range of electoral
subject matter. From Citizens United to Federal Elections
Commission (FEC) control mechanisms, solutions on how to
change our campaign finance regulatory regime cover a large
and diverse area of law and policy. However, the central theme
throughout these reforms is maximizing transparency and
curbing the undue influence of candidates through large
donations.
The vast majority of current large-scale campaign efforts,
from mayoral and gubernatorial through presidential races,
actively seek out support from wealthy individuals and
institutions. Although this alone does not suggest that a
candidate is beholden to those who provide the most monetary
support, it discourages candidates and parties from increasing
their constituent base to include large numbers of everyday
voters. In the eyes of reformers, the focus of modern campaigns
has gone from creating policy that benefits the population to
creating policy benefiting those that offer the candidate the most
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economic utility.1 In response to this, reformers have offered a
number of solutions that aim to harmonize the policies proposed
by a given candidate and the policies needed by a given
represented population.
One of the current, but often overlooked, reform proposals
is the creation of matching systems for small donors. Given the
rise of small donors during the 2016 presidential election, such
programs have taken on new importance.2 Through a mixture of
public and private funds, these small-donor apparatuses aim to
add greater diversity to a campaign’s finances while minimizing
the sway that large donors have on candidates. These systems,
however, have serious practical and constitutional flaws.
This Article will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of
small-donor matching programs in modern elections. Although
other campaign finance reforms will be mentioned, the focus of
discussion will be on proposed legislation and academic
solutions specific to small-donor matching. These programs do
not exist in a bubble detached from larger reform efforts, but
they do occupy a wholly unique area of policy that, at times,
intersects with greater notions of American law. Part II of this
Article will introduce the subject of campaign finance in greater
detail. Part III will discuss recent legislation and will analyze
their efficacy both practically and constitutionally. Part IV will
include a broader policy discussion on small-donor matching,
and Part V will conclude the Article.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Early Reforms
Prospective candidates for elected office have engaged in
illegal campaign activity since the very beginning of our
country’s history. In order to secure a seat in the Virginia House
of Burgesses in 1757 (the first democratically elected legislature
in the American British colonies), George Washington
distributed over 140 gallons of beer, cider, rum, and other
1. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens 12 PERSP. POL. 564, 564-81 (2014).
2. See Summary Data for Bernie Sanders, 2016 Cycle, OPEN SECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/candidate.php?id=N00000528
[https://perma.cc/7V7V-4DBV].
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alcohol to his constituents.3 At the time, there were only 391
voters in his district.4 Once elected to office, the legislature
immediately passed a law prohibiting such behavior in future
elections.5 When James Madison ran for a seat in Virginia’s
House of Delegates in 1777, he vowed not to bribe voters with
“the corrupting influence of spirituous liquors, and other
treats . . . .”6 He failed to win election.7 Although such behavior
was illegal, it was often supported and encouraged.8 During the
years prior to the rise of Tammany Hall-era New York City (not
to mention the era itself), campaign finance violations were
alleged against mayoral candidates and other city officials.9 The
city’s 1838 mayoral election included vote buying and other
forms of illegal support solicitation.10 Even in today’s elections,
local candidates have utilized similar tactics.11
As illustrated above, early illegal campaign finance activity
(pre–1854, the New York City mayoral election of Fernando
Wood) centered around influencing the voter. The first
3. Lisa Bramen, Swilling the Planters with Bumbo: When Booze Bought Elections,
SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(Oct.
20,
2010),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/artsculture/swilling-the-planters-with-bumbo-when-booze-bought-elections-102758236/?no-ist
[https://perma.cc/Z6DN-P942 ] (quoting DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND
FALL OF PROHIBITION 47 (2010)).
4. Victor W. Geraci, Campaign Finance Reform Historical Timeline, CONN.
NETWORK,
http://www.ctn.state.ct.us/civics/campaign_finance/Support%20Materials/CTN%20CFR%
20Timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LYP-RWDX].
5. Jaime Fuller, From George Washington to Shaun McCutcheon: A Brief-ish
History of Campaign Finance Reform, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2014, 9:15 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/03/a-history-of-campaignfinance-reform-from-george-washington-to-shaun-mccutcheon/ [https://perma.cc/7QTZUUF6].
6. Nat’l Archives, James Madison: Defeated for Election to Virginia House of
Delegates,
[24
April]
1777,
FOUNDERS
ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-01-02-0062 [https://perma.cc/JAF6HEAF].
7. Bramen, supra note 3.
8. Id.
9. See Library of Cong., Henry R. Robinson: The Last Card. Tip Overthrown, LIBR.
CONGRESS: ONLINE CATALOG, https://lccn.loc.gov/2008661395 [https://perma.cc/S9ZRBMTJ].
10. See Geraci, supra note 4; Library of Cong., supra note 9.
11. Melissa Brown, Sorority Offered Free Drinks to Members to Vote in Tuscaloosa
City Board of Education Race, AL.COM: BLOG (Aug. 28, 2013, 4:52 PM),
http://blog.al.com/tuscaloosa/2013/08/sorority_offered_free_drinks_t.html
[https://perma.cc/KCA2-7TPG].
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campaign finance reform legislation, the 1876 Naval
Appropriations Bill, aimed to stop the illicit exhortation of naval
yard workers by banning campaign solicitations from them.12
However, by the mid-1800s, the flow of money reversed and
influence started to come not from public officials but from
wealthy citizens. Machine politics dominated by private
individuals exerting control over office holders caused Mark
Twain to remark in a speech given on the 4th of July 1876, “I
think I can say, and say with pride that we have some
legislatures that bring higher prices than any in the world.”13
Four years earlier Jay Cooke, a wealthy railroad financier and
grandfather of investment banking, contributed $50,000 to
Ulysses S. Grant’s presidential campaign, prompting one
historian to note, “never before was a candidate placed under
such great obligation to men of wealth.”14
Government reforms were slow to catch up. In 1883, the
United States Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act
(Pendleton Act).15 This extended the protections in the earlier
1876 Naval Appropriations Bill to all government employees.16
The Pendleton Act was passed, in part, to stop the firing of
federal employees that did not contribute campaign donations
during election years.17 While this solved the problem of buying
votes (and the inverse, buying of offices by federal employees),
it did little to curb the influence of wealthy private individuals.
By 1896, presidential campaigns started to seek larger donations
from private institutions.18 William McKinley, succeeding
12. Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, Important Dates: Federal Campaign Finance Legislation,
CTR.
FOR
PUB.
INTEGRITY
(May
19,
2014,
12:19
PM),
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2004/03/25/5852/important-dates-federal-campaignfinance-legislation [https://perma.cc/5E24-WQ4D].
13.
Mark
Twain:
Speech
July
4,
1873,
TWAIN
QUOTES,
http://www.twainquotes.com/Legislators.html [https://perma.cc/J5NR-M8NN].
14. JASON GRUMET, CITY OF RIVALS: RESTORING THE GLORIOUS MESS OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 43 (1st ed. 2014).
15.
Transcript
of
Pendleton
Act
(1883),
OUR
DOCUMENTS,
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=48&page=transcript
[https://perma.cc/W4YY-G2ZL].
16. Univ. of Hous., Annotation to The Pendleton Act (1883), DIGITAL HIST.,
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=1098
[https://perma.cc/2MNQ-CLY4].
17. Id.
18. MICHAEL NELSON, GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH,
289 (5th ed. 2013).
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Grover Cleveland, ended his campaign with over $7 million
worth of expenditures.19 In comparison, William Jennings
Bryan (McKinley’s opponent), had only raised approximately
$650,000.20 The driving force behind McKinley’s success was
soliciting donations from private corporations.21 McKinley’s
campaign manager, Alonzo Hanna, had encouraged corporations
to donate “according to [their] stake in the general prosperity of
the country.”22
In 1907, The Tillman Act became the first federal
legislation to directly address this growing problem.23 The Act,
advocated for a year earlier by President Theodore Roosevelt,
barred contributions from corporations and other financial
entities.24 Interestingly, Roosevelt had first called for a public
financing system (a component of later small-donor matching
programs!) alongside a ban on corporate donations, but the bill
was later watered down in the House and Senate.25 A few years
following the Tillman Act, Congress passed robust legislation,
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, that set spending limits for
congressional candidates and created the first requirements for
financial campaign disclosures.26
However, in 1921 the
Supreme Court, in Newberry v. United States, found the
majority of the act and later amendments unconstitutional,
including spending limit restrictions.27
Running counter to these early reforms in campaign finance
came a massive expansion of the American voter base in 1913
and again in 1920. The Seventeenth Amendment, calling for the
direct election of U.S. Senators, expanded the electorate by

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Geraci, supra note 4.
Id.
NELSON, supra note 18, at 289.
Id. at 372, note 93.
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A
SOURCEBOOK 36 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997).
24. Id.
25. See Fed. Election Comm’n, Public Funding of Presidential Elections, FED.
ELECTION COMMISSION (2017), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml
[https://perma.cc/EG2G-ZRDU].
26. See Cullen Couch, Citizens United: First Amendment Protection or Pandora’s
Box?,
UVA
LAW.
(2012),
http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/alumni/uvalawyer/spr12/citizens.htm
[https://perma.cc/5X4Y-2HUG].
27. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 243-57 (1921).
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vesting the power to elect Senators with voters, instead of state
legislatures.28 By doing so, the Amendment also created a
stronger protection against institutional practices aimed at
buying senate seats through the influence of such legislatures.29
With the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment seven years
later, the American voter base was again massively expanded.30
Such a rapid growth of voters necessarily increased campaign
financing efforts. While Congress tried to pass further reforms
in the face of a rise in campaign contributions by amending the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, little progress was made.31 In
fact, enforcement mechanisms within the legislation were so lax
that Lyndon B. Johnson once described the Act as “more
loophole than law.”32

B. The Rise of the Political Action Committee (PAC)
By the mid-1930s, the birth of unionized labor brought a
new influx of cash to state and federal political campaigns. One
of the first major unions to become directly involved in the
political arena at this time was the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO).33 Up until 1943, labor unions could donate
directly to political campaigns and party organizations; however,
with the passing of the Smith-Connally Act that same year,
direct union donations became illegal.34 Additionally, other
congressional legislation in the 1930s and 1940s restricted the
level of participation by federal employees in elections, many of
whom were unionized.35
These new restrictions forced unions to seek other ways in
which to advance their interests and policies in elections. In
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
31. See CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 29.
32. John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Lyndon B. Johnson: Statement by the
President upon Signing the Foreign Investors Tax Act and the Presidential Election Fund
Act
(November
13,
1966),
A M.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28030 [https://perma.cc/8KME-6GCY].
33. See Geraci, supra note 4.
34. See CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 30.
35. See 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)-(c) (2012). For concurrent campaign finance legislation,
see Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935),
repealed by Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat.
972 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 16451 (2016)).
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1944, a year following the passage of the Smith-Connally Act,
the CIO established the first PAC in American history.36 In
many ways, the first CIO PAC gave rise to our modern system
of PACs and super PACs. However, additional federal
legislation was created soon after the establishment of the CIO
PAC to further curb influence of private money in federal
elections.37 The Taft-Hartley Act, passed in 1947, created a
permanent ban on contributions from unions, corporations, and
financial institutions in federal elections.38 This essentially
quashed further creation of PACs by unions and other parties. It
was not until 1971 that PACs were again recognized as
legitimate campaign finance vehicles.39

C. The Federal Elections Campaign Act, the Supreme
Court, and the Modern Landscape of Campaign
Finance
In 1971, the U.S. Congress passed its first comprehensive
campaign reform legislation, the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA).40 Interestingly enough, FECA was originally signed
into law by then President Richard Nixon,41 and the Act later
used a rationale against him for impeachment.42 While the
original text focused primarily on heightened campaign
disclosure requirements, by 1974—in response to the Watergate
scandal—the Act was amended to include contribution and
spending limits.43

36. Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, supra note 12.
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (2006).
38. Farhana Hossain, Changes in the Way Corporations Can Finance Campaigns,
N.Y.
Times
(Jan.
21,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/01/19/us/politics/0120-scotuscampaign.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/NL2Y-J4R6].
39. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 301(d), 86 Stat.
3, 11 (1972).
40. Federal Election Campaign Act § 101, 86 Stat. at 3.
41. John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Richard Nixon: Statement on Signing the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (February 7, 1972), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3725 [https://perma.cc/75BF-NNL2].
42. Nixon Campaign Violation, LODI NEWS-SENTINEL, Mar. 13, 1973, at 1;
Overview, Part 3: The Past Reforms – A Look at the Laws, WASH. POST. (1998),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/campfin/intro3.htm
[https://perma.cc/44EM-QMJA].
43. Overview, Part 3: The Past Reforms—A Look at the Laws, supra note 42.
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The most important development to arise out of the postWatergate 1974 amendments was the creation of the Federal
Elections Commission (FEC).44 The FEC remains the principal
governmental organization for campaign finance enforcement.45
Another, less heralded, campaign finance reform that set the
stage for future small-donor matching programs (discussed in
subsequent sections), was the 1971 Revenue Act.46 The
Revenue Act established a public financing system for
presidential elections based on income tax.47 It also included tax
credits for contributions (although such credits were eventually
removed out of the Act years later).48 Today, the public
financing established under the Revenue Act appears on every
U.S. income tax return form as the “Presidential Election
Campaign Fund” checkoff.49
By the mid-1970s, FECA had fallen under intense judicial
scrutiny.50 The earlier 1974 amendments centering around
campaign spending limits became a central battleground
between the government and a wide variety of Senators and
activist organizations encompassing both sides of the political
spectrum.51 In 1976, the landmark Buckley v. Valeo decision
gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to directly analyze how
campaigns interact with the country’s basic constitutional
guarantees.52 In its decision, the Court determined that limiting
the spending of candidates, political parties, and other groups
(including PACs) violated the First Amendment protection on
free speech.53 However, the Court did uphold limits on
44. Fed. Election Comm’n, About the FEC, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/about.shtml [https://perma.cc/DC4D-6U3S].
45. Id.
46. Fed. Election Comm’n, Public Funding of Presidential Elections, supra note 25.
47. Id.
48. Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, supra note 12.
49. Fed. Election Comm’n, The $3 Tax Checkoff, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION
(1993), http://www.fec.gov/info/checkoff.htm [https://perma.cc/8CGW-8C9R].
50. Fed. Election Comm’n, Court Case Abstracts, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation_CCA_B.shtml
[https://perma.cc/2TLG-7WKX]
(providing a succinct list of federal court cases—full links to each case can be found on the
webpage); see also Rebecca Curry, Making Law with Lawsuits: Understanding Judicial
Review in Campaign Finance Policy, 46 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 389, 440-41 (2013).
51. Brief for Appellants, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos. 75-436 and 75437), 1975 WL 173792, at *14-25.
52. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6, 11 (1976).
53. Id. at 19-20.

2017]

VIABILITY OF THE SMALL DONOR

65

maximum contributions and, importantly, upheld a public
financing system in which candidates voluntarily participate.54
The requirements placed on candidates who opt into a financing
system based on public funds could, without violating the First
Amendment, have their spending capped.55 Such a recognition
of alternative campaign financing mechanisms further laid the
foundation for future small-donor matching programs.56
Subsequent to the decision in Buckley, Congress amended
FECA to comply with the Supreme Court ruling.57 In 1979,
further amendments were added that officially recognized the
use of donations to political parties, PACs, and other nonaffiliated organizations.58
During the 1980s and early 1990s, campaign finance
reform stalled.59 Bills killed in Congress, despite receiving
widespread support, include a bill calling for strict campaign
financing restrictions; a bill and constitutional amendment
calling for spending limits; and spending limits on PACs. In
1992, then President George Bush vetoed the Congressional
Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act.60 This act
would have created a system of partial public funding for
candidates who chose to agree to voluntary campaign spending
limits.61 Additionally, the bill called for a ban on soft money
(contributions to political parties and PACs, as opposed to direct
contributions to candidates) donations to presidential
campaigns.62 Congress eventually failed to override the vetoed
bill.63
Interestingly enough, in 1990, the Supreme Court in Austin
v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce found restrictions on corporate
54. Id. at 143.
55. Id. at 29.
56. Id. at 128. For the discerning law student, they will remember Buckley v. Valeo
as the constitutional law case that touched on Congress’s appointment powers.
57. Geraci, supra note 4.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See S. 3 – Congressional Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act of
1992,
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/senate-bill/3
[https://perma.cc/P75X-SRSZ] (showing that the Senate failed to override the presidential
veto).
61. See 138 CONG. REC. 8999 (1992).
62. See 138 CONG. REC. 9009 (1992).
63. See 138 CONG. REC. 11,146 (1992).
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expenditures to be constitutional and not a violation of free
speech.64 In the decision, the majority opinion noted that
“[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence elections . . . .”65 This
decision was ultimately overruled by Citizens United v. FEC.66
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a flurry of campaign
finance legislation was pushed through Congress, with varying
levels of success. In 1999, Representative Asa Hutchinson [RAR-3] proposed a bill that banned soft money contributions
while raising hard-money limits.67
That same year,
Representative Bill Thomas [R-CA-21] proposed FEC reforms
and a wholesale ban on foreign political donations.68 A
bipartisan bill originating in the Senate called for a ban on soft
money and restrictions on campaign advertising.69 This era,
however, was not without counter-legislation. Representative
John Doolittle [R-CA-4] offered a bill that removed all
contribution limits first established under FECA.70
The greatest legislation on campaign finance reform, the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA or McCain-Feingold
Act), set the stage for the judicial showdowns of the late 2000s.71
The McCain-Feingold Act prohibited soft money contributions
to political parties and revised FECA spending limits.72
Additionally, the Act addressed advocacy advertisements,
dubbed “electioneering communications” by for profit and nonprofit corporations.73 In 2003, after facing criticism from both
political parties, the Act’s bans on soft money and restrictions
on political ads survived a Supreme Court challenge in
McConnell v. FEC.74
64. See 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990).
65. Id. at 660.
66. See 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
67. Campaign Integrity Act of 1999, H.R. 1867, 106th Cong. (introducing the bill to
the House on May 19, 1999).
68. Campaign Reform and Election Integrity Act of 1999, H.R. 2668, 106th Cong.
(introducing the bill to the House on August 2, 1999).
69. Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 417, 106th Cong. §
101(a), 308(1)(A)-(B) (introducing the bill to the House on September 16, 1999).
70. Citizen Legislature and Political Freedom Act, H.R. 1922, 106th Cong. § 2
(introducing the bill to the House, May 25, 1999).
71. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81 (2002).
72. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act §§ 304, 323, 116 Stat. at 82, 97.
73. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 201(f)(3), 116 Stat. at 89.
74. 540 U.S. 93, 159, 202-03 (2003).
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The McCain-Feingold Act continued to face a variety of
judicial challenges leading up to the 2010 Supreme Court
decision in Citizens United. In 2006, the Supreme Court found
Vermont’s campaign donation caps to be an unconstitutional
violation of free speech.75 A year later, the Court rolled back
political advertising restrictions in FEC v. Wis. Right to Life,
Inc.76 Although Wis. Right to Life has largely been replaced by
Citizens United, the Court did raise important First Amendment
concerns that may impact the efficacy of future alternative
campaign financing programs.77 Additionally in 2008, the
Court’s decision in Davis v. FEC reaffirmed the supremacy of
the First Amendment over legislative restrictions on campaign
contribution limits.78 Specifically, a provision in the McCainFeingold Act, called the “Millionaire’s Amendment,” would
have allowed the raising of the contribution caps for non-selffunded candidates.79 The aim of this provision was to empower
candidates without considerable personal financial support the
ability to compete with wealthy individuals whose self-funding
subverted the rationale behind contribution limits.80 This idea,
realized in the McCain-Feingold Act, is an essential rationale
behind today’s small-donor matching programs.
In 2010, the most damaging blow to the McCain-Feingold
Act was dealt by Citizens United. In a 5-4 split, the Supreme
Court held that the government could not restrict the campaign
spending of corporations, unions, and other organizations such
as PACs.81 By arguing that the political advertising restrictions
in the Act were a violation of the First Amendment, the Court
extended the rationale of Wis. Right to Life to corporate
expenditures as a whole.82 Later cases and FEC advisory
opinions have further solidified the holding in Citizens United.
SpeechNOW.org v. FEC and the FEC’s advisory opinion in Club

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 231, 246 (2006).
551 U.S. 449, 481 (2007).
Id. at 456, 475.
554 U.S. 724, 738 (2008).
Id. at 729.
Id. at 749 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
Id. at 319.
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for Growth loosened the barriers on donation limitations.83 In
2011, an FEC advisory opinion for Commonsense Ten, which
built on the opinion in Club for Growth, allowed for
contributions outside of “restricted classes” that essentially led
to the rise of the modern “super Pac”.84 Further advisory
opinions and lower court decisions have extended First
Amendment protections on political speech through campaign
donations.85 Later Supreme Court decisions have also eroded
lingering attempts at campaign finance reform. In 2011, the
Court found that an alternative financing program utilizing
public funds to match spending of non-program participating
candidates in Arizona was an unconstitutional restriction on free
speech.86 Most recently, in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Supreme
Court held that FECA restrictions on aggregated individual
contribution amounts violated the First Amendment.87 This
current landscape, although appearing hostile towards the
creation of the alternative financing system, has set the stage for
a resurgent discussion on small-donor matching programs.
Along with the 2015-2016 presidential election, federal smalldonor matching programs are being considered once again as
viable mechanisms for campaign finance reform.88

III. SMALL-DONOR MATCHING
A. Rationale
Support for small-donor matching programs as an
alternative to traditional campaign finance reforms centers
around a number of policy rationales. The programs themselves

83. 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Keating v. FEC, 562 U.S. 1003
(2010); Club for Growth, Inc., Fed. Election Comm’n Advisory Op. 2010-09 (2010),
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO%202010-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/LA6V-D3LU].
84. Commonsense Ten, Fed. Election Comm’n Advisory Op. 2010-11 (2010),
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO%202010-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/AET4-BYGX].
85. Nat’l Def. Comm., Fed. Election Comm’n Advisory Op. 2012-27 (2012),
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO%202012-27.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EBB-LS6Y]; see also
Carey v. FEC, 864 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61-62 (D.D.C. 2012).
86. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 754-55
(2011).
87. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014).
88. See Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, 114th Cong. (2015); Fair
Elections Now Act, S. 1538, 114th Cong. (2015).
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match private small-dollar donations with public funds.89 In
order to receive these public funds, a candidate must first qualify
and then voluntarily opt into the program.90 In light of this, the
policy rationales of these programs attempt to encompass both
voters and candidates.
First, using public funds to support those seeking elected
office is nothing new. Public funds remove the steep financial
barriers faced by many candidates. Those without high levels of
wealth often cannot compete with those that have great personal
and institutional financial backing.
Second, small-donor
matching systems attempt to remove the influence of large
money donations. By utilizing majority public funds, candidates
are less likely to appear beholden to the interests of big ticket
donors. A third rationale, one that focuses more on how
campaigns spend the money they receive, is that a level
advertising field means an equal opportunity for the public to
hear each candidate’s message. Additionally, on a broader level,
small-donor matching programs can raise the diversity of
contributing donors.

B. Current Legislation
The idea of federal small-donor matching programs first
originated in legislation during the run-up to and in the wake of
Citizens United.91 Legislation proposed in the 114th Congress
(2015-2016) has mirrored, built on, and further refined these
earlier attempts.92 Two bills were proposed during this cycle:
the Government by the People Act (GBPA), and the Fair
Elections Now Act (FENA). Although both have iterations in
former legislation, these new acts have been refined in light of
McCutcheon.93 Both the GBPA and FENA have gained
89. Glenn Hudson, Comment, Think Small: The Future of Public Financing After
Arizona Free Enterprise, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 413, 429 (2012).
90. James Sample, The Last Rites of Public Campaign Financing?, 92 NEB. L. REV.
349, 371 (2013).
91. See Government by the People Act of 2014, H.R. 20, 113th Cong. (2014); Fair
Elections Now Act, H.R. 6116, 111th Cong. (2010).
92. See Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, 114th Cong. (2015); Fair
Elections Now Act, S. 1538, 114th Cong. (2015).
93. Compare supra note 91 (allowing minimal amounts of small-donor matching),
with supra note 92 (expanding small-donor matching programs in ways such as increasing
the matching percentage and voucher programs).
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middling support in the House and Senate.94 More importantly,
both seek to establish a voluntary system in which candidates for
federal office, after receiving a benchmark level of small-donor
support (somewhere between approximately 750-2000 unique
donations), opt-in to receive matching public funds while
abiding by stricter financial restrictions.95
The GBPA’s small-donor matching program centers around
a voucher system. Any individual, at his or her request, receives
a voucher named the “My Voice Voucher” from a state body
created by the Act.96 This body is tasked with running the
program, much like a state election board.97 With a total value
of fifty dollars, the voucher enables an individual to contribute
to qualified candidates in five dollar increments.98 Additionally,
an individual can revoke a voucher within two days of
submitting it.99 Using the voucher in this way would be
considered an appropriate political contribution under FECA.100
Individuals who participate in the voucher system receive a fifty
percent tax credit of the amount of voucher spent.101
On the candidate side, the GBPA sets out restrictions for
those who qualify and choose to opt into the small-donor
matching program. For instance, candidates participating in the
program cannot set up joint fundraising committees with
separate entities other than entities already associated with the
candidate.102 This essentially removes the ability to jointly
fundraise with organizations such as the DNC and RNC. The
GPBA also prohibits candidates from associating with PACs and
comes with enforcement mechanisms, including civil penalties

94. See Cosponsors: H.R. 20 – 114th Congress (2015-2016), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/20/cosponsors
[https://perma.cc/4PWR-MMAR]; Cosponsors: S. 1538 – 114th Congress (2015-2016),
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senatebill/1538/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/EKX5-77B6].
95. See Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, 114th Cong. §§ 512, 531,
532 (2015); Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, 114th Cong. § 511, 512, 521, 523 (2015).
96. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at § 112(a)(1)(A).
97. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at §§ 112(c), 113.
98. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at § 112(a)(1).
99. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at § 112(b).
100. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at §§ 101, 112.
101. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, 114th Cong. § 101 (2015).
102. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at § 521(e).

2017]

VIABILITY OF THE SMALL DONOR

71

for those in contravention.103 Additionally, the Act places
requirements on television and radio broadcasters that require
easier access for candidates and political parties.104 The main
draw for candidates to opt into the GPBA is its public funds
matching system.
A candidate, after reaching certain
benchmarks, can receive up to 600% additional matched funds
based on a total of small-donor contributions.105 This percentage
rises for those who seek to agree to even greater restrictions.106
Unlike the GBPA, FENA employs a more simplistic
system.107 For the average voter, donating to a campaign would
proceed without vouchers.108 However, much like the GBPA,
taxpayers would receive a fifty percent tax credit on
contributions up to a specified amount.109 For participating
candidates, restrictions and matching benefits effectively mirror
those of the GBPA.110 The striking difference is that FENA
employs a voucher system for media advertising.111 Here, each
candidate is offered a set amount of money to spend on
advertising per district.112
Other activity surrounding small-donor matching programs
in Congress has not come in the form of proposed legislation,
but rather resolutions.113 Although these resolutions are focused
more broadly on campaign finance reform at large, both
specifically advocate the implementation of these programs.114
The resolutions, however, have gained little support among
other congressional members.115
103. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at §§ 521(f), 544.
104. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at §§ 401(c), (h).
105. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at § 501(b)(1).
106. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at § 501(b)(2).
107. See Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, 114th Cong. (2015).
108. Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, at § 512(b).
109. Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, at § 401(a).
110. Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, at §§ 101, 522, 523.
111. Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, at § 524(a).
112. Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, at § 524(c).
113. Restore Democracy Resolution, H.R. Res. 298, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res.
336, 114th Cong. (2015).
114. See Restore Democracy Resolution, H.R. Res. 298, at § 301; H.R. Res. 336, at
§ 1.
115. See H. Res. 298 (114th): Restore Democracy Resolution, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hres298 [https://perma.cc/4VP5-GJ4K]; H.
Res. 336 (114th): Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives Regarding the
Need to Create a Small Donor and Public Finance System for Congressional Elections,
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C. Current Implementation
The use of small-donor matching programs similar in
structure to current federal legislation has been rare. Though
only fourteen states and multiple large municipalities have
programs on the books, they have yet to be utilized enough to
develop measurable data points.116 Montgomery County,
Maryland, which encompasses Bethesda, Silver Springs, and
Rockville (home to the most expensive congressional seat in the
nation) passed a small-donor matching bill in 2014 for
candidates seeking public office.117
However, political
resistance led to the program going unfunded.118
New York City also has a voluntary small-donor matching
program.119 The program, like those proposed in Congress,
offers a 600% matching of public funds.120 However, unlike the
legislative proposals, the New York City system does not come
with strong reform mechanisms. Both joint fundraising and
political committees, such as PACs, are still allowed as viable
sources of funding for candidates who opt into the system.121
The most robust reforms in the New York City system are
focused on campaign spending. Specifically, the reforms act as
back-end regulations for large dollar contributions.122 Although
capped expenditures offer some protection from influence,
campaigns are still free to accept donations (for the most part)
from a variety of different entities.123
GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hres336
[https://perma.cc/F4SD-7AJP].
116. Editorial Bd., A Montgomery County Campaign Finance Bill Empowers Small
Donors, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/amontgomery-county-campaign-finance-bill-that-empowers-smalldonors/2014/09/13/33fdaac8-3ac7-11e4-8601-97ba88884ffd_story.html
[https://perma.cc/VK77-5RSQ].
117. MONTGOMERY, MD., CTY. CODE art. IV, §§ 16-19, -23 (2014).
118. Emily Scarr, Campaign Update: Funding Fair Elections in Montgomery
County,
M D.
PIRG:
BLOG
(Apr.
6,
2015),
http://www.marylandpirg.org/blogs/blog/mdp/campaign-update-funding-fair-electionsmontgomery-county [https://perma.cc/VK43-MQ53].
119. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., CAMPAIGN FINANCE HANDBOOK: 2017 ELECTION
CYCLE v-vi (2d ed. 2015).
120. Id. at vi.
121. N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 3-707(1) (2016); N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 3-715 (2016).
122. N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 3-706(1) (2016).
123. N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 3-703 (2016) (listing additional restrictions to which
candidates must adhere).
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The reason these programs have survived post-Citizens
United is that voluntary systems have been upheld as
appropriate campaign finance reforms.124 Despite the fact that
aspects of these programs have not survived, the bare framework
remains viable.125
Restrictions on spending and some
contribution limits remain illegal. However, since Buckley v.
Valeo, public funds matching programs have been
constitutional.126 Additionally, restrictions on joint-committee
fundraising remain allowed.127

IV. WHAT DO WE SEEK TO ACHIEVE WITH
SMALL-DONOR MATCHING PROGRAMS AND
HOW DO WE ACHIEVE IT?
A. What Do We Seek to Achieve?
In reforming our campaign finance system, small-donor
matching programs attempt to accomplish a number of
important policy objectives. By relying primarily on smaller
contributions, do we incentivize the type of behavior that
campaign finance reform efforts generally seek to achieve? In
other words, do these programs remove the influence of special
interests in our elections?
The answer is complicated.128 Small-donor matching
programs rely on a number of different variables to function
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
Id.
See 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976).
Id.
See Erinn Larkin, Benefits and Inequalities of Matching Funds, CFO
CONSULTING GROUP (Aug. 28, 2013) http://www.cfo-compliance.com/benefits-andinequalities-of-matching-funds/ [https://perma.cc/JDY3-338V]; Lee Drutman, What Ezra
Klein Gets Wrong About Big vs. Small Money in Politics, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (May 10,
2013, 1:41 PM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/05/10/big-vs-small-money-inpolitics/ [https://perma.cc/PN45-PV89] (responding to Ezra Klein, Small Donors May
Make Politics Even Worse, BLOOMBERGVIEW (May 8, 2013, 6:00 PM),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-05-08/small-donors-may-make-politicseven-worse [https://perma.cc/8K9L-64Z7]); Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance
Regulation: Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences, CATO INST.: CATO
POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 238 (Sept. 13, 1995), https://www.cato.org/publications/policyanalysis/campaign-finance-regulation-faulty-assumptions-undemocratic-consequences
[https://perma.cc/ERQ3-LC7U]. See generally Michael J. Malbin et al., Small Donors, Big
Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, 11
ELECTION L.J. 3 (2012) (determining that small donor matching funds increase the number
of donors who give and diversity of donating groups, and that this greater civic
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properly.129 In creating a working system, legislatures have to
determine which policies to further and which to leave behind.130
Often times, there are no clear answers at the time laws are
written.131 Additionally, what may work in one setting may not
further the same policy objectives in another.132 For instance, in
Boulder, Colorado, public funds come directly from the city’s
budget, while in Suffolk County, New York, the public funds
are sourced from private donations to an elections fund.133
Austin, Texas, employs a hybrid system that borrows from both
Boulder and Suffolk.134 Therefore, the creation of a small-donor
system on a national scale is a difficult endeavor.
Amplifying the influence of the average small donor is one
of the foundational policy objectives of these programs.135 By
sextupling a voter’s single contribution, an individual
experiences a magnification of their “political voice” or
influence.136 If we measure “political voice” as amount of
donation per person, certainly a system that turns a ten dollar
contribution to a seventy dollar contribution with no additional
expense to the voter is one that creates a sixty dollar net gain of
“political voice.” On an individual basis, such a gain may be
participation benefits civil society); David A. Primo, What Does Research Say About
Public Funding for Political Campaigns? (2010) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ij.org/report/what-does-research-say-about-public-funding-for-political-campaigns/
[https://perma.cc/FXN6-KPUR] (arguing that there is no evidence that “special interest”
influence is reduced through public funding).
129. The Key Decisions of a Small Donor Matching Program with Examples from
Various Cities, ILL. CAMPAIGN FOR POL. REFORM, http://www.ilcampaign.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/Key-Decisions-of-a-Small-Donor-Matching-Program.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D9KU-Z76J] (listing the key decisions that must be made in small donor
matching programs: which offices/elections are covered, the level of matching per
contribution, the overall limit per office, to open or close the system, candidate
qualifications, millionaire/PAC triggers, funding sources, and other requirements for
candidates who opt-in).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The Key Decisions of a Small Donor Matching Program with Examples from
Various Cities, supra note 129 (noting that candidates who opt into Austin’s small-donor
program are also required to participate in mandatory debates).
135. ELISABETH GENN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, DONOR DIVERSITY
THROUGH
PUBLIC
MATCHING
FUNDS
4,
9,
12-13,
16
(2012),
http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/donor-diversity-through-public-matching-funds
[https://perma.cc/4YRQ-2PZR].
136. Id. at 4.
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more of a moral victory as opposed to a paradigm shifting
contribution. Candidates who opt into small-donor matching
programs can still accept large donations.137 In theory a $700
contribution from a prominent businessman would have the
same political voice as a $100/$700 matched contribution from
an inconsequential voter. However, such a scenario ignores
reality. It is much more likely that the prominent businessman’s
political voice will be stronger than that of the small donor’s.
This is because the prominent businessman can offer the
candidate services and access an average citizen cannot. The
businessman is more likely than the small donor to have the
economic means to donate again.
Additionally, he is
presumably part of a larger network of prominent
businesspeople who could also be potential contribution sources
to a campaign. Many small donors do not have such utility.
On a larger scale, the calculus changes.138 Seven $100
donations that are then matched certainly have a greater
monetary value than one $700 contribution. If our goal is to
raise the amount of donation per person as a way to increase that
person’s influence in the system, then small-donor matching
programs achieve this. However, this is a highly limited
definition of influence. The same type of individuals that are
used as foils for current reforms will still max out contributions
to a candidate, regardless of whether a candidate has agreed to
participate in a small-donor matching program.139 Such a system
does not affect donors who contribute over the threshold amount
of money that qualifies as a donation for public fund
matching.140
137. ANGELA MIGALLY & SUSAN LISS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, SMALL
DONOR MATCHING FUNDS: THE NYC ELECTION EXPERIENCE 4 (2010),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Small%20Donor%20Matching%2
0Funds-The%20NYC%20Election%20Experience.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2RW-JDT7].
138. Malbin et al., supra note 128, at 13-16.
139. Reena Flores, George Clooney Talks “Obscene” Money in Politics, CBS NEWS
(Apr. 17, 2016, 1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-clooney-politicalfundraisers-cost-an-obscene-amount-of-money [https://perma.cc/8F69-4FEG]. But see Ted
Johnson, Hillary Clinton Raises Huge Sums at Homes of George Clooney, Jeffrey
Katzenberg,
VARIETY
(Apr.
16,
2016,
5:12
PM),
http://www.variety.com/2016/biz/news/hillary-clinton-george-clooney-fundraiser-jefferykatzenberg-1201755147/ [https://perma.cc/5AN6-BG7L].
140. Libby Watson, How Political Megadonors Can Give Almost $500,000 with a
Single
Check,
SUNLIGHT
FOUND.
(June
1,
2016,
11:44
PM),
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If the aim is to amplify a small donor’s political voice
against a different source of financial influence, matching
systems gain more legitimacy. By opting into such a system
with the same structure as the proposed federal legislation,
candidates bar themselves from accepting money or support
from joint fundraising committees and political action
committees (this is not entirely truthful, more on this in the
following section).141 If the aim of small-donor programs is to
push back against joint-fundraising committees, then the
maximization of voters’ political voices may matter less, overall,
than some of the other legislative restrictions built into the
program. Viewed this way, small-donor matching through
public funds seems to incentivize candidates to agree to these
other financial restrictions. Absent such an incentive, no
reasonable candidate would agree to limit political contributions
without a counter-benefit.
Another primary aim of small-donor matching programs is
to boost electoral participation.142 This can be achieved in a
two-fold way.143 First, as argued above, boosting the influence
(perceived or not) of small donors encourages a greater ease of
access among voters.144 This raises the diversity in the donor
base.145
Second, small-donor matching programs push
candidates to form larger constituencies.146 The idea here is that
by magnifying donations on a six to one ratio, a candidate will
actively seek this type of financial support.147 This makes sense
in light of the additional fundraising restrictions of these
programs.148
The above policy, however, suffers from a faulty
assumption. Although we may seek to achieve greater electoral
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/06/01/how-political-megadonors-can-give-almost500000-with-a-single-check/ [https://perma.cc/GNS4-X5M3].
141. Towards a Small Donor Democracy in the District of Columbia: Policy
Components of a Small Donor Campaign Finance System, CITIZEN,
http://citizen.org/documents/DC%20Small%20Donor%20Matching%20FundsThe%20NYC%20Election%20Experience.pdf [https://perma.cc/37XY-VJFW].
142. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 137, at 1.
143. Id. at 6-21.
144. Id. at 7-8.
145. GENN ET AL., supra note 135, at 4.
146. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 137, at 6, 11-13.
147. Id. at 4, 14.
148. Id. at 7.
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participation through small-donor matching programs, does
amplifying the political voice of a voter really correlate to an
increase in ballots cast?149 The answer, at least in part, does not
support this assumption.150 In 2009, voter turnout in the New
York City mayoral election reached an all-time low.151 Four
years later, in 2013, voter turnout was down even more.152 Both
elections saw candidates utilize the city’s small-donor matching
programs.153 This suggests that small-donor matching programs,
or at least the core mechanisms of the programs that activate
contribution matching through public funds, do not boost
electoral participation.
Total vote numbers, however, do not explain the whole
picture. While the number of ballots cast may have been at
historic lows, participation in communities not normally
engaged in the electoral process have risen.154 There is evidence
to suggest traditionally minority neighborhoods in New York
City participated more, at least financially, when small-donor
matching programs were in place.155 In the majority-minority
Bedford Stuyvesant neighborhood, contribution numbers were
eleven times greater in elections with small-donor matching
programs than in elections without such programs during the
2009-2010 cycle.156 The same neighborhood saw a 100%
increase in the number of participating voters (from 11% to
22%) in New York City’s mayoral Democratic primary between
149. Another argument is whether or not this should be the intended effect of smalldonor matching programs. Perhaps political voice is less quantifiable than we would like
to assume. Can this amplification shape the policy and dialogue of a campaign without a
complimentary increase in votes?
150. Larkin, supra note 128; Sam Roberts, New York: Voter Turnout Appears to Be
Record
Low,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
6
2013,
10:06
AM),
http://www.nytimes.com/news/election-2013/2013/11/06/new-york-turnout-appearsheaded-for-record-low/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5ZQX-9L6F].
151. Larkin, supra note 128.
152. Roberts, supra note 150.
153. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., BY THE PEOPLE: THE NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN
FINANCE
PROGRAM
IN
THE
2013
ELECTIONS
44-46
(2014),
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2013_PER/2013_PER.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X6DG2CRP].
154. N.Y.C. Bd. Of Elections, Statement and Return Report for Certification,
General
Election
2013,
http://vote.nyc.ny.us/downloads/pdf/results/2013/2013GeneralElection/00001100000Cityw
ide%20Mayor%20Citywide%20Recap.pdf [https://perma.cc/QRG7-YP8R].
155. GENN ET AL., supra note 135, at 14-15.
156. Id. at 18.
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2009 and 2013.157 During this time, other New York minoritymajority neighborhoods experienced similar increases in voter
participation. In Chinatown, contributions were eight times
greater while voting increased 72.8% (from 14% to 24.2%).158
In Harlem and the Bronx, contributions were three times greater
while voting increased by an average of over 100% in both
areas.159
The data here emphasizes the disparity between majorityminority neighborhoods and non-minority neighborhoods.
Small-donor matching programs appear to boost voter turnout in
areas traditionally removed from the electoral process.160 This
seems to fulfill one of the main policy objectives of these
programs.161 However, in viewing this data, one should keep in
mind that correlation between an increase in contributions under
a small-donor matching program and an increase in electoral
participation may not mean that an increase in participation was
specifically caused by such a program. The reality is that while
these trends suggest that small-donor matching programs do
boost voter turnout, the sample size is small.

157. Ctr. for Urban Research & CUNY Graduate Sch. of Journalism, Public Use
Microdata Area/PUMA 4003: Covering the Bedford Stuyvesant Neighborhood(s) in
Brooklyn,
NYC
ELECTION
ATLAS,
http://www.electionatlas.nyc/tables.html
[https://perma.cc/CK36-ZXS8]. This is an interactive database of election results sortable
by many different variables. Here the data is sorted for the Bedford Stuyvesant
neighborhood. Select “By Community Area” tab; then select “Brooklyn – Bedford
Stuyvesant.”
158. Ctr. for Urban Research & CUNY Graduate Sch. of Journalism, Public Use
Microdata Area/PUMA 3809: Covering the Lower East Side/Chinatown Neighborhood(s)
in Manhattan, NYC ELECTION ATLAS, http://www.electionatlas.nyc/tables.html
[https://perma.cc/CK36-ZXS8]. This is an interactive database of election results sortable
by many different variables. Here the data is sorted for the Chinatown neighborhood.
Select “By Community Area” tab; then select “Manhattan – Lower East Side/Chinatown.”
159. Ctr. for Urban Research & CUNY Graduate Sch. of Journalism, Public Use
Microdata Area/PUMA 3708: Covering the Highbridge/South Concourse Neighborhood(s)
in
Bronx,
NYC
ELECTION
ATLAS,
http://www.electionatlas.nyc/tables.html
[https://perma.cc/CK36-ZXS8]. This is an interactive database of election results sortable
by many different variables. Here the data is sorted for the Bronx and Harlem (Northern
Manhattan) neighborhoods. For Bronx, select “By Community Area” tab; then select
“Bronx – Highbridge/South Concourse.” For Harlem, select “By Community Area” tab;
then select “Manhattan – Central Harlem” and select “By Community Area” tab; then
select “Manhattan – East Harlem.”
160. STEVEN M. LEVIN, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, KEEPING IT CLEAN:
PUBLIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 11 (2006).
161. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 137, at 13.
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Finally, of the major policy objectives that small-donor
matching programs seek to achieve, ensuring a greater ease of
electoral access for non-prominent candidates is the most readily
quantifiable.
Minority candidates, those without large
institutional support, directly benefit from programs that match
small donations with public funds.162 These candidates include
candidates of non-majority race and ethnicities, women, young
candidates, and candidates without strong financials.163 Looking
back at New York City’s mayoral contests, the wide variety of
candidates in both party primary competitions and the general
elections suggest that public funds matching programs increase
access for non-prominent candidates.164
If our aim is to induce a greater number of candidates to
run for office, small-donor matching programs certainly achieve
this objective.165 With more candidates entering into contests, a
greater number of different ideas enter into the electoral
conversation.166 With a greater number of choices, voters have
an increased ability to vote for a candidate that matches their
ideals.167
Conversely, having more candidates does not
necessarily equate to having more unique viewpoints. An
increase in number is no guarantee for an increase in
independent policies. Additionally, political leanings may not
align with party affiliation. For instance, in the 2013 New York
City Mayoral election, candidate Tom Allon declared as a
Democrat, withdrew and declared as a Republican, and was later
nominated by the Liberal Party as their candidate.168

162. LEVIN, supra note 160, at 5, 7.
163. LEVIN, supra note 160, at 5-7.
164. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., NEW YORKERS MAKE THEIR VOICES HEARD: A
REPORT
ON
THE
2009
ELECTIONS
2,
5,
11
(2010),
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2009_PER/2009PostElectionReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CCN3-DXYV].
165. MIMI MARZIANA ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, MORE THAN
COMBATING CORRUPTION: THE OTHER BENEFITS OF PUBLIC FINANCING 2 (2011),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/more-combating-corruption-other-benefits-publicfinancing [https://perma.cc/976S-DNMM].
166. Id. at 4.
167. Id. at 6, 8.
168. Michael M. Grynbaum, Allon Exits Race for New York Mayor, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/nyregion/allon-drops-out-of-racefor-new-york-mayor.html [https://perma.cc/MU3C-32DV].
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Additionally, this policy is not without negatives. A few
have argued that small-donor matching programs excessively
favor more well-known candidates.169 The argument follows
that these candidates receive a greater financial benefit through
name recognition.170 Additionally, even candidates who are
extremely popular with low-income populations derive the
majority of their support from a small cadre of wealthy
donors.171
The negatives, however, rely on their own set of faulty
assumptions.
Well-known politicians, those with name
recognition, will derive the same benefit regardless of
participation in a small-donor matching program. While these
candidates will still receive matching public funds, this criticism
ignores the specific rationale behind these programs. The aim of
these programs is to allow for greater ease of access, not limit
the amount of small-donor money entering campaigns.
Although the total amount of money raised increases, so does
the percentage of money coming from small contributions.
Thus, even a small donation to a well-known candidate advances
the underlying principles of campaign finance reform.

B. How Do We Achieve It?
Up until now, the discussion has focused solely on smalldonor matching programs. These programs have a wide variety
of mechanisms all aimed at reforming campaign finance in some
way. However, are these methods appropriate?
What
implementation obstacles do small-donor matching programs
face? Are there better alternatives? While the discussion so far
has centered on municipal and state races, the legislation
currently in Congress focuses on House and Senate races. In
light of a robust discussion on whether such programs can be
implemented on a national level for presidential races, the
discussion that follows is meant to track these larger elections.
The most prominent aspect of any small-donor matching
program is the program’s reliance on public funds. As
previously discussed above, public funds matching achieves a
169. Smith, supra note 128, at 8-9.
170. Id. at 9.
171. Id.
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variety of policy objectives. Is it, however, in and of itself, good
policy? In the abstract, as a distinct and separate reform
mechanism, public funds matching is beneficial as a reform. In
reality, these programs exist with other controls, such as caps on
campaign spending. Taken together, these programs face a
number of significant implementation hurdles.
An essential part of formulating good policy is determining
how to implement it. In order for small-donor matching
programs to have any meaningful affect, they must be executed
in a way that leads to their long-term survival. Oftentimes,
implementation mechanisms are built into legislation.172
However, ill thought-out mechanisms can lead to the complete
inefficacy of a program.173 Therefore, it is important to analyze
how to achieve the policy behind small-donor matching
programs in conjunction with a discussion on what the policy
be. These two ideas are not mutually exclusive and impact each
other in many ways.
First, public funds matching programs cannot control the
amount of large dollar contributions a candidate receives.
Although it is constitutional to cap expenditure limits for those
who voluntarily opt into a matching program, one cannot
constitutionally lower donor contribution limits.174 If the goal is
removing the undue influence that large donors exert, smalldonor matching programs may not be the best solution.
Although the influence of small donors is elevated, large donor
influence is not removed. Additionally, while candidates are
barred from holding a direct leadership position with political
action committees, there is no constitutional bar for their
independent operation.175 PACs and Super PACs can function to
support any candidate, regardless of whether the candidate has
opted into a small-donor matching program.
If neither large donations nor PAC activity is reigned in,
are small-donor programs really that effective? After Citizens
United, restrictions on these activities are definitively

172. See Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, 114th Cong. §§ 531(a), (c)-(e) (2015);
Government by the People Act of 2014, H.R. 20, 113th Cong. § 111 (2014).
173. Scarr, supra note 118.
174. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319, 339 (2010).
175. Id. at 337.
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unconstitutional.176 In this sense, these programs are necessarily
blunted. There is little we can do, legislatively, to limit
contribution limits. However, the next best thing—the objective
small-donor matching programs seek to achieve—is elevating
the political voice of the average donor. Though it may not be
the best way, it may be the only way to indirectly minimize the
influence of PACs and large donors.
Second, these programs have negative effects on other
aspects of the electoral process. Restrictions on coordination
with joint committees hurt local and state candidates who rely
on joint-committee funds during general elections. While
removing coordination removes the “loophole” that allows
donors to essentially donate twice to a specific candidate, it also
lowers the ability of joint committees (like the DNC’s “Victory
Fund”) to support down-ballot races.177 The effect of the
removal of the loophole is considerable: for the 2016
Democratic presidential candidates, the maximum donation
totals to $2,700 while a “Victory Fund” maximum donation
totals to $360,000 per calendar year.178
One can certainly see the pushback against joint
committees that can raise $360,000 a year from any one person.
However, not all money goes to the specific candidate who is in
coordination with the joint committee.179 For 2016, at maximum
contribution levels, a specific Democratic presidential campaign
would only receive $5,400, while national and state parties
receive the remainder in different amounts.180 Since jointcommittee fundraising is propelled by candidates, banning such
activity reduces the money that flows into national and state
parties. This money ultimately supports general election
candidates on a local, state, and national level. In presidential
elections, joint-committee fundraising contributes a non176. Id. at 353-57.
177. The term “loophole” is used loosely here to describe a means of working
around the system, not of any illegality.
178. Fed. Election Comm’n, Citizens’ Guide, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/citizens.shtml [https://perma.cc/PT78-H7CL]; Peter
Overby, How Hillary Clinton Could Ask a Single Donor for Over $700,000, NPR POL.
(Dec. 23, 2015, 5:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/12/23/460762853/how-hillary-clintoncould-ask-a-single-donor-for-over-700-000 [https://perma.cc/4RQJ-YW75].
179. Overby, supra note 178.
180. Id.
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negligible amount of money to these national and state parties.181
By removing coordination between joint-committees and
candidates, small-donor matching programs weaken efforts to
elect additional candidates from the same party. When
formulating legislation, lawmakers must balance the desire to
support their respective party against the desire to pass effective
campaign finance reforms.
Third, there are clear First Amendment restrictions to the
implementation of small-donor matching programs. After
Citizens United, legislation must be formulated carefully to
avoid violating robust free speech protections.182 Although
making the system voluntary removes some of the concerns
around limiting political speech, these programs create potential
inequities. Problems arise when one candidate opts into a smalldonor matching program while another one does not. At this
point, while one candidate is free to raise and spend how she
wants, the other is limited. While they may have done so
voluntarily, they did so understanding that other candidates
would play by the same rules.183 The incentives that come with
these programs would suggest full participation (on current local
and state levels). However, when expanded to a national level,
full participation by candidates does not offer the same
incentives as they do in smaller races. For instance, joint
fundraising committees become more powerful. Considering
this, there is an argument that the inequalities existing between
participating and not participating in such a program are too
strong to overcome constitutionally.
A fourth concern centers around the public costs of such a
program. Taxpayers would undoubtedly be affected.184 On a
federal and national level, such costs could be immense.185
Current legislation in Congress has built-in, revenue-neutral
181. Matea Gold & Tom Hamburger, Democratic Party Fundraising Effort Helps
Clinton
Find
New
Donors,
Too,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
20,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democratic-party-fundraising-effort-helpsclinton-find-new-donors-too/2016/02/19/b8535cea-d68f-11e5-b1952e29a4e13425_story.html [https://perma.cc/7WWZ-5MWZ].
182. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
183. See generally Ganesh Sitaraman, Contracting Around Citizens United, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 755 (2014) (providing an in-depth view of how candidates enter into
voluntary agreements to circumvent Citizens United).
184. Smith, supra note 128, at 13.
185. Id.
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provisions.186 However, these provisions will be subject to
heavy revisions if such legislation advances towards
promulgation.187 The bills actually acknowledge this—built into
the text are tax credits.188 While a credit may not fully
counteract an anticipated tax increase, it does stand to serve
some compensatory interest. This compensatory interest has to
come from somewhere, regardless of the bill being revenueneutral. Implementation costs will, more likely than not, call for
some monetary consideration from taxpayers.
In light of this, are small-donor matching programs a viable
solution? The answer is undoubtedly an affirmative one.
Within the current legal and judicial landscape, small-donor
matching programs stand as one of the best solutions to wide
reaching campaign finance problems.
Although negative
externalities may be created by such a program’s
implementation, the positives far outweigh the costs. Smalldonor matching programs boost electoral participation on both
sides of the ballot (candidates and voters). They also amplify
the political voice of the average donor. Though state and
national parties may be weakened through the ban on jointcommittee coordination, joint-committees can still fundraise in a
variety of different ways. However, when candidates truly
invest time in creating policies that affect their broader and
diverse constituencies, state and federal parties win on a more
meaningful level.

V. CONCLUSION
Campaign finance reform has a long and unique history
within this country. Small-donor matching programs are just
one of many different aspects within a larger effort to reform our
electoral process. These programs boost participation among a
diverse set of constituencies.
They encourage greater
involvement in the political process and a greater moral
investment in the election of candidates that best reflect a voter’s
ideals. Small-donor programs elevate the political voice of the
average voter, which encourages candidates to work directly
186. Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, 114th Cong. § 501(e) (2015).
187. See supra note 88.
188. Government by the People Act, H.R. 20, 113th Cong. § 101 (2015); Fair
Elections Now Act, S. 1538, at § 501(e).
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with their constituencies and not just wealthy influencers.
Although these programs may not be the best solution in
abstract, within our current campaign finance framework, they
are the best chance for meaningful reform.

